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Trade Credit and Bank Information Monopoly: An Empirical evidence from 
Portuguese Small Medium Size Enterprises 
 
Resumo: 
A literatura acerca do relacionamento entre bancos e empresas, sustenta que; uma relação de 
proximidade caracterizada pela troca de informação privilegiada, permite a redução da 
assimetria de informação, e, deste modo, a obtenção de crédito em condições mais vantajosas. 
Todavia esta vantagem informacional proporciona ao banco (Hausbank) um monopólio de 
informação, que lhe permite aumentar no futuro as taxas de juro (hold-up problem), uma vez 
que os bancos externos a esta relação, apresentam relutância em propor condições de crédito 
mais vantajosas. Neste contexto, o crédito de fornecedores, obtido junto dos mesmos, assume 
cada vez mais relevância. O objectivo desta investigação consiste em analisar em que medida o 
recurso ao crédito de fornecedores permite às empresas minimizar os efeitos do hold-up 
problem. Utilizando uma amostra de 468 pequenas e médias empresas industriais portuguesas 
(PME) para o período de 1998 a 2006, os resultados obtidos confirmam que um aumento da 
taxa de juro do crédito bancário está associado a um incremento do crédito de fornecedores. 
Este incremento é particularmente expressivo nas PME que mantêm uma relação de monopólio 
(negoceiam com apenas um banco – Hausbank), comparativamente às PME que optam por 
estabelecer relações multilaterais e, em períodos em que as PME enfrentam problemas de 
liquidez. Estes resultados estão em sintonia com as teorias que enfatizam a função financeira 
associada ao crédito de fornecedores, constituindo deste modo, uma fonte de financiamento 
alternativa ao crédito bancário. 
 
Abstract: 
According previous studies, a bank can set up a higher interest rate for small company by 
establishing a lending relationship since information asymmetry limits competition between 
banks. Therefore, the bank can acquire monopoly rents from small company. However, not only 
banks, but also suppliers of trade credit acquire information of buyers´ creditworthiness. This 
paper investigates how serious is monopoly information for Portuguese SMEs. We investigate if 
the informed non-financial companies can extend trade credit in order to decrease the 
monopolistic power of lenders that might lead to hold-up problems, by analyzing companies 
that obtain funds from just one bank and those who obtain funds from several banks. By using a 
panel data of 468 Portuguese SMEs for the period of 1998-2006, our results strongly suggest 
that high interest rates are associated to an increase in the use of trade credit. Furthermore, the 
findings support the existence of a link between suppliers and customers that take time to build 
and leads to suppliers help their customers who experience temporary liquidity shocks. Thus, 
the provision of trade credit alleviates the problem of monopolies information 
 
Key words: Trade Credit, Bank Information Monopoly, Hold-up Problem, Asymmetric 
Information. 
 





The existence of asymmetric information in capital markets means financial institutions 
cannot adequately assess the investment projects of their borrowers. As pointed out by 
Berger and Udell (1998), this effect becomes marked in the case of small business, due 
to the huge difficulties they encounter in transmitting reliable information about their 
real status and performance. As a consequence, smaller companies have higher 
problems obtaining both their required levels of bank financing and sufficiently 
favourable conditions of borrowing.  
 
Previous studies argue that the establishing a long-term relationship between the bank 
and the borrower mitigates the problem of asymmetric information (e.g. Leland and 
Pyle, 1977; Campbell 1979; Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984; Diamond, 1984; Fama, 
1985; Boyd and Prescott, 1986; Rajan, 1992; Boot et al. 1993; Bhattacharaya and 
Thakor, 1993; Boot and Takor, 1994; Yosha, 1995; Bhattacharaya and Chisea, 1995). 
The establishment of a strong relationship with a financial institution increases the 
credit availability (Petersen and Rajan 1994), borrowers with longer banking 
relationships are less likely to pledge collateral (Berger and Udell, 1995). However, 
recent studies also point out a dark side of the lending relationship (e.g. Kane and 
Malkiel, 1965; Blackwell and Santomero, 1982; Greenbaum et al. 1989; Sharpe, 1990; 
Rajan, 1992; Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996). Sharp 
(1990) and Rajan (1992) show that companies borrowing from just one financial 
intermediary are “informationally captured”, as no one else knows the real risk of the 
company. In these circumstances the monopolistic relationship may be exploited in 
order to charge higher interest rate on new loans or even to rational additional 
borrowing. Borrowers cannot borrow from uninformed banks due to the problem of 
information asymmetry; consequently they come across a hold-up problem. Since the 
informed bank can extract rent, the borrower (particularly, for good quality companies) 
is discouraged to invest. To avoid the hold-up-problem, the borrower establishes 
relationships with multiple banks (Farinha and Santos, 2002; Von Thaden, 1994). When 
many informed banks accomplish loans to the borrower, they are unable to achieve 
monopoly rent (Detragiache et al. 2000). 
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Nevertheless, not only banks, but also suppliers of trade credit acquire information of 
buyers´ creditworthiness. Some authors argue that trade creditors acquire private 
information that is similar – in some cases, superior – to the information acquired by 
banks (e.g. Mian and Smith, 1992; Biais and Gollier, 1997; Cook, 1997; Jain, 2001; 
Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004; Cunat, 2007; Miwa and Ramseyer, 2005; Fabri and 
Menichini, 2006). Since trade creditors acquire soft information as well as hard 
information over time in order to monitor their customers and use this information to 
make credit decisions, they act like banks as a relationship lenders. 
 
In this paper we investigated how serious is monopoly information for Portuguese small 
medium size companies (SMEs). We reflected on the point of view of a loan customer 
who faces severe financing restrictions and finances predominantly through a 
relationship lender. We investigated if the informed non-financial companies can extend 
trade credit in order to decrease the monopolistic power of lenders that might lead to 
hold-up problems, by analyzing companies that obtain funds from just  one bank and 
those who obtain funds from several banks. The main contribution of this paper to the 
existing literature lies in presenting this rather uncommon approach, and analyzing 
ways to reduce the hold-up problem as well as ways to gain access to new, more 
desirable sources of financing.  
 
Using a panel data of 468 Portuguese small companies, our analysis shows that 
companies that have less collateral assets cannot easily borrow from banks (i.e. bank 
credit is backward looking and depends on the collateral accumulated in previous 
periods), so they faced the problem of credit rationing. Since suppliers can easily 
liquidate the borrower’s current assets, high interest rates are associated to an increase 
in the use of trade credit, which confirm the finance motive of trade credit. Furthermore, 
the findings support the existence of a link between suppliers and customers that take 
time to build and leads to suppliers help their customers when experience temporary 
liquidity shocks. Hence trade creditors act as relationship lenders. Thus, the provision of 
trade credit alleviates the problem of information monopolies. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. In section II we review the literature on long-term 
relationship with banks and trade creditors. We also discuss how serious the monopoly 
information can be. We describe the dataset, variables and the methodology in section 
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III. In section IV we discuss empirical results. Section V concludes with a summary of 
the main findings. 
 
2. Lending Relationship 
 
2.1. Bank Lending Relationship: Cost or Benefit? 
 
The modern literature on financial intermediation has long emphasized the value 
creation function of lending relationships. In a context of asymmetric information in the 
credit markets, lending relationships facilitates the information exchange between 
borrower and the lender through the provision of multiple financial services. Lenders 
invest in generating information from their client firms and borrowers are more inclined 
to disclose information (Boot, 2000). In consequence, the information asymmetries 
between the bank and the company are lessened as time goes by through many 
channels. Having a long-term scope permits the design of implicit credit contracts over 
the duration of relationships that increase value, for instance, through reduction in 
welfare dissipating collateral requirements (Berger and Udell, 1995), through the 
development of welfare-enhancing intertemporal tax-subsidy schemes in loan pricing 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1995), as well as through more flexible contracting terms (Boot et 
al. 1993). The information generated by lender over repeated transactions and over time 
is also beneficial in terms of savings on the fixed cost of screening and monitoring 
(Boot and Thakor, 2000). It also avoids the free-rider problem of monitoring since the 
bank internalizes the benefits of such investments. Higher monitoring levels increase 
value since for instance; they help solve principal-agent problems of managerial 
behaviour. Additionally, relationship banks develop sector-specific expertise that 
enhances the value of financed projects (Boot and Thakor, 2000). Supported on these 
arguments, lending relationships with banks are valuable for the borrowers to mitigate 
the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard [e.g. firms whose loans are renewed 
will be seen as of good reputation (Diamond, 1991)]. 
 
However, previous works also point out a dark side of the lending relationship. An 
exclusive bank relationship originates an asymmetric evolution of the information 
between that bank and the others lenders (Kane and Malkiel, 1965). Having a single 
relationship gives a data monopoly to the informed bank that might exploit its 
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bargaining power over the company and extract rents (Greenbaum et al. 1989; Sharpe, 
1990; Rajan, 1992). As pointed out by Sharpe (1990), the possibility of extracting these 
rents encourages banks to compete with one another and lend funds with little 
information about the quality of borrowers. If an inefficient allocation of resources the 
benefits that bank losses will be paid for by the clients who have maintained their 
relationships with a bank (D’Auria et al. 1999; Lehmann and Newberger, 2001). These 
studies conclude that the problems of information monopolies are serious for borrowers, 
especially for the smallest, youngest companies due to the lack of credit history, the 
impossibility to credibly disclose their quality and the lack of separation between 
ownership and management. Recent studies emphasize that the establishment of 
multiple lending relationships is a strategy to avoid extraction of rents from the banks 
(Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996; Boot and Thakor, 2000; Detragiache et al. 2000; Carletti 
et al. 2007).1 For example, Detragiache et al. (2000) and Farinha and Santos (2002) 
show that the borrower establishes multiple relationships with banks to reduce the 
likelihood of early liquidation. 
 
2.2. Are Trade Creditors Relationship Lenders? 
 
Commercial banks and suppliers are the largest providers of debt financing for U.S. 
firms (Berger and Udell, 1998). Similar evidence is found for European countries (Reid, 
2003; Franks and Sussman, 2005). Many previous studies analyse theoretically the 
function of trade credit (e.g. Schwartz, 1974; Schwartz and Whitcomb, 1978, 1979; 
Ferris, 1981; Emery, 1987). Despite the abundance of studies of trade credit in the 
literature, there is very little agreement on the nature and motivation for use of trade 
credit. According to Frank and Maksimovic (2005) the theories of trade credit fit into 
two broad categories: real operations based theories and financial theories. Real 
operations based theories sustain a variety of motivations including transaction cost 
minimization, price details and quality guaranties (e.g. Ferris, 1981; Emery, 1987; 
Brennan et al. 1988; Long et al. 1993; Emery and Nayar 1998). Financial theories 
sustain that suppliers have informational and monitoring advantages over traditional 
lenders. Advantages related to product collateral value and superior liquidation ability 
                                                 
1 See Boot (2000) and Gorton and Winton (2003) for useful surveys of relationship lending and Ongena 
and Smith (2000) for empirical studies about multiple banking relationships. 
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are pointed out by Mian and Smith (1992), Frank and Maksimovic (2005), Santos and 
Longhoper (2003). Cunat (2007), emphasizes the repayment enforcement mechanism 
compared to banks because suppliers can strategically withhold suppliers; the creditor 
vulnerability to product diversification is sustained by Burkart and Ellingsen (2004), 
and Burkart et al. (2004).  
 
Others, such Mian and Smith (1992), Biais and Gollier (1997), Cook (1997), Jain 
(2001), Cunat (2007), Miwa and Ramseyer (2005), and Fabri and Menichini (2006) 
argue that trade creditors acquire private information about their customers. Indeed, 
financial theories either explicitly or implicitly emphasize that trade creditors (i.e. 
product sellers) may have abilities to circumcise the traditional problems of 
informational asymmetry and moral hazard at least as well, if not better than banks. The 
main arguments that explain this advantage of suppliers vis-à-vis of banks are: i) the 
supplier is supposed to possess a better knowledge of the technology and of the markets 
of its customers and hence can appraise their quality with a greater percussion than 
banks do; ii) a supplier may also threaten to stop future supplies and may be in a better 
position to reload and resell goods in case of default than banks and iii) finally, in 
lending goods, not cash as the banks do, suppliers are less concerned with cash 
diversification by their customers. Biais and Gollier (1997) go one step further and 
suggest that trade credit may also act as a signal of a company’s quality. They show that 
trade credit reveals the private information of the suppliers to the bank which, in turn, 
can update its beliefs about customer default risk. Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) agency 
model’s reaches a similar result. More specifically, they show that additional trade 
credit increases the investment size and thereby the entrepreneur’s residual return and 
hence decreases the entrepreneur’s incentive to divert cash. As a consequence suppliers 
have a monitoring advantage over banks. Based on previous arguments, suppliers may 
possess some advantages over traditional financial intermediaries in collecting 
information on other non-financial companies, in assessing their creditworthiness and 
finally in controlling their actions2. 
                                                 
2 Despite the lack of an explicit model, the hypotheses of trade creditors are relationship lenders (in the 
pure sense of linking the accumulation of private information with the strength of the relationship) is well 
established in the literature (e.g. Mian and Smith, 1992; Cunat, 2007; Miwa and Ramseyer, 2005). 
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2.3. Monopoly Information – How Serious It Can Be? 
 
In previous sections we argued that because SMEs usually do not have access to capital 
markets the two major sources of debt financing are bank loans and trade credit. In 
capital market-based financial systems (e.g. U.S. or U.K.) bank lending takes place at 
arm’s length. In contrast, in a bank-based financial system [the case of Portugal, 
according the taxonomy of LaPorta et al. (1998)], is generally exercised through close 
long-term relationships between banks and their customers. This way of providing 
companies with bank loans is widely known as the Hausbank principle (e.g. Elsas and 
Krahnen, 1998; Behr and Güttler, 2007). 
 
A Hausbank may be defined as the premier lender to a company. By virtue of this 
special relationship, it has more detailed and timelier information about its customer 
than a comparable arm’s – length bank would. Nevertheless what kind of information 
the bank acquires over time as the strength of the relationship grows? Berger et al. 
(2005) argue that the informed bank acquires soft information of borrowers. Soft 
information is defined as information that is difficult to quantify and verify (for 
example, the information of character and reliability of the company’s owner). 
Hausbank can acquire soft information of borrowers over time, which cannot be 
transferred from or to other lenders. This places Hausbanks in a position to exert market 
power that can lead to hold-up problems for borrowers (Boot, 2000; Degryse and Van 
Cayseele, 2000). Changing a bank relationship is costly for the borrower because the 
new bank does not have the same amount and quality of information, and therefore will 
charge the debtor a risk premium to make up for this lack of information (switching 
costs)3.  
 
Consequently, in accessing a new source of bank financing, the companies face an 
adverse selection problem, arising because new lenders have less information than 
relationship lenders (Detragiache et al. 2000). To reduce the hold-up effect companies 
can opt for multiple bank relationships (Howorth et al. 2003; Houston and James, 1996; 
Farinha and Santos, 2002; Rajan, 1992; Behr and Güttler, 2007). These results suggest 
                                                 
3 Switching costs incorporate not only the risk margin but also search costs for a new bank and other 
internal costs associated with a new bank relationship. 
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that the number of companies that have relationships with one or few banks is higher if 
the company’s size is small. 
 
Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) assume implicitly that only banks offer credit for 
borrowers. However, implicit borrowing in the form of trade credit constitutes also an 
important source of funding for companies with difficult access to financial markets 
(Fishman and Love, 2003)4. Indeed suppliers have incentives in offering credit to their 
customers. As pointed out by Petersen and Rajan (1997:689): “the supplier has an 
implicit equity stake in the company equivalent to the present value of the margins he 
makes on current and future sales of the product to the company. This may far exceed 
the implicit equity stake a financial institution may have because of the potential for 
future business…”. As sustained by financial theories, suppliers may be better able to 
evaluate and control the credit risk of their customers than specialized financial 
institutions, such as banks. For instance, suppliers may have an advantage in 
information acquisition: they can observe the size and timing of orders, the ability of 
companies to take advantage of early payment discounts (e.g. Smith, 1987; Biais and 
Gollier, 1997). Even though banks can collect similar information via transactions 
accounts, suppliers are likely to obtain the information in a faster and cheaper way 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Cunat, 2007). In addition, because of the very short-term 
nature of trade credit, suppliers have the ability to react faster when adverse information 
emerges whereas banks may have to wait actual default. Suppliers also may be able to 
seize delivered goods from customers that not pay. When these goods subsequently can 
be resold to other customers, suppliers may have an advantage in extending credit to 
high-risk firms (Mian and Smith, 1992; Huyghebaert, 2006; Huyghebaert et al. 2007). 
For instance, Wilner (2000) documents that suppliers grant more concessions to 
distressed customers when they wish to maintain an enduring product market 
relationship, consequently, tend to be more lenient towards financially distressed 
companies than credit market lenders, such as banks. 
                                                 
4 Recent papers argue that borrowers use more trade credit when trade credit from banks is unavailable 
due the information asymmetry problem (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; McMillan and Woodruff, 1999; Ng 
et al. 1999; Fishman and Love, 2003; Wilner, 2000; Gama et al. 2008). However, as point out by 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2001) trade credit use as a substitute to bank lending can depend on a 
country’s legal system. For instance, the negative relation between the size of trade credit and the 
efficiency of a country’s legal system is enforcing contracts, to the extent that this benefits financial 
intermediaries, i.e. natural suppliers of credit. 
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It is common that suppliers offer trade credit for buyers in Portugal (Demirgüc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic, 2001; Bardes, 2002; Marotta, 2005; Banco de Portugal, 2009). 
However, trade credit is considered to be an expensive source of financing (e.g. Smith, 
1987; Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1997; Cunat, 2007). The credit term most frequently 
adopted by suppliers is “2/10 net 30” (Ng et al. 1999). This term represents a 2% 
discount for payment within the 10-day discount period; the net periods ends on day 30. 
The implicit interest rate on the trade credit under this terms amounts to 40% (Wilner, 
2000). 
 
Although, recent criticism in the literature has emphasized that this approach may be 
too simplistic (Marotta, 2005; Miwa and Ramseyer, 2005). The trade credit own cost 
depends on the contractual clauses – implied interest rates in two part contracts allowing 
for discounts for faster payments and penalties for ex-post delays and on the extend they 
are enforced. Nevertheless the spread cannot be easily computed because it depends on 
how common is the two-part contract (Ng et al. 1999).  
 
Additionally, and related how widespread are penalties for late payments, Wilner (2000) 
shows that a majority of U.S. companies did not implement rate payment penalty. 
Similar evidence is provided by Pike and Cheng (2001) for U.K.. But most problematic, 
however, is the fact that the price of underlying product is not observable to the 
empiricist (Miwa and Ramseyer, 2005). As a consequence, it is distinctly possible that 
trade credit is no more expensive than bank credit (Marotta, 2005; Miwa and Ramseyer, 
2005).  
 




In order to test whether the informed non-financial firms can alleviate the problems of 
bank information monopolies by extend trade credit, we collect the data from the 
database AMADEUS, a dataset collected by Bureaus Van Djik (BVJ). This database 
includes standardised annual accounts (consolidated and unconsolidated) for 
approximately 9 millions of companies through Europe, including Eastern Europe. Due 
to the fact, that we have only had access to the Amadeus dataset since 1998, this 
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establishes 1998 the year as a starting point for our analysis. To be included in the 
dataset, the companies must have at least one employee and had fulfilled the 
requirements established in the European Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 
(2003/361/EC)5. In order to control the survivor bias effect, we selected active and 
inactive companies. We restricted our sample to manufacturing companies because in 
this sector buying intermediate goods from a supplier represents an expressive part of 
the company’s inputs (Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2001; Marotta, 2005; Cunat, 
2007). Because our main focus of analysis is small young companies, companies with 
more than 25 years were dropped. After eliminating companies with high levels of 
missing and inconsistent data (e.g. total assets are different from total shareholders 
funds plus liabilities), our final sample consists of an unbalanced panel data of 468 
SMEs for the period of 1998-2006. 
 
3.2. Variables and Methodology 
 
To analyse the relation between bank information monopolies and trade credit we 
estimate the following regression: 
 
Trade Creditit = X’itβ + ηi + λt + εit   (1) 
 
where Xit is the vector of independent variables for the company i in the year t, ηi are the 
companies’ non-observable individual effect, λt are temporary dummy variables and εit 
is the random error. 
 
To obtain a measure of trade credit usage, we use the ratio of trade credit to total assets 
(TC1). This ratio gives the percentage of total assets that is financed by trade credit and 
therefore represents a company’s reliance on intercompany credit. We also use the ratio 
trade credit to total debt (TC2) to measure whether the company is bank or trade credit 
dependent (Cunat, 2007). Related to the independent variables, we focus on variables of 
credit terms with banks that include the variables collateral and interest rate, company’s 
characteristics and control variables. 
                                                 
5 According to the European Commission Recommendation (2003/61/CE) to be considered a small 
company, for at least two criteria need to be respected: i) having less than 250 employees and ii) having 
an annual business volume not exceeding € 50 million or assets not exceeding € 43 million. 
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The proportion of trade credit with respect to other forms of finance depends on the 
level of collateral that companies have. As pointed out by Petersen and Rajan (1997) 
and Cunat (2007) trade credit levels are forward looking because they depend on the 
future value of the relationship between supplier and customer (suppliers hold a large 
implicit equity stake in companies especially with favourable growth prospects), 
whereas bank credit is backward looking and depends on the collateral accumulated in 
previous periods. We expect that the higher the level of collateralized assets, the lower 
the expected proportion of trade credit. The ratio of company’s tangible assets to total 
debt is the proxy for collateral assets.  
 
If the only bank as information of the borrower’s creditworthiness, it can set a higher 
interest rate and uses the threat of not refinancing its borrowers as a way to enforce debt 
repayment (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990; Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992). Thus the 
problem of an information monopoly is serious when a borrower has a long-term 
relationship with one or few banks (Detragiache et al. 2000). To investigate whether the 
problems of monopolies are serious to Portuguese SMEs we also introduce the variable 
DInteraction (DBank1xInterest) created by the interaction of the variables interest (the 
ratio of company´s interest expenses to the sum of its short-term debt and long-term 
debt) and the variable DBank1. DBank1 is a dummy that takes the value one if the 
company obtains funds from just one financial institution and zero otherwise. If 
suppliers have also information of the borrower’s creditworthiness, the borrower can be 
financed from non financial companies when the bank sets up the interest rate too high. 
Therefore, the coefficients of the interest rate must be statically and economically 
positive if the problems of information monopolies are alleviated by trade creditors.  
 
We include three proxies of the company’s characteristics: demand for short term credit, 
sales growth and profitability. According the transaction theory, the primary benefit of 
trade credit is a cash management tool (Schwartz, 1974). By delaying the payment for 
purchases, a company may be able to match the timing of cash receipts from sales with 
the cash outlays for the cost of goods sold. However, as Ferris (1981) argues trade credit 
becomes less an instrument of trade credit and more an instrument of finance as the 
length of credit period increases, with the seller acting as a financial intermediary. Trade 
credit extension then becomes a type of short-term loan between seller and buyer that is 
tied to the exchange goods in terms of value and timing (Franks et al. 1985). 
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Consequently, companies that demand short-term credit use more trade credit. We use 
the ratio of current assets excluding cast to total assets as a proxy for the demand for 
short term credit. The general demand for funds depends on the expected future growth. 
We expect that companies are growing more quickly to have a higher proportion of 
their assets financed with short-term credit in general and trade credit in particular. To 
capture this effect we use the variable sales growth. In the presence of asymmetric 
information, Myers and Majluf (1984) claim that companies establish a hierarchy of 
sources to be used for financing, preferring those carrying a lower cost (and also a lower 
risk). Therefore, the company’s ability to generate cash internally will decrease its 
demand for trade credit. We use the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total 
assets as a proxy for the company’s reliance on internally generated funds. Two control 
variables are included: age and size6.  
 
The variable age has been used in the literature to identify new financing constrains and 
negative shocks to firm prospects (e.g. Fazzari et al. 1998; Cleary, 1999; Cunat, 2007). 
The size of the borrower is an inverse measure of its information opaqueness, as smaller 
companies use to be in poorer financial conditions and have less experience and public 
information7. It is important to reinforce that many factors affect the amount of trade 
credit, but we cannot obtain all variables that affect the determinants of trade credit (e.g. 
the characteristics of the company’s owner, the company’s management policy and the 
characteristics of supplier’s owner). By using panel data, the problems of omitted 
variables and endogenous are mitigated. 
 
When using panel data, one of the elements that involve the higher problem is the non-
observable heterogeneity (ηi) which occurs because of the existence of a series of non-
observable individual effects. As the name indicates, such effects are associated with 
the individual companies making up the panel, but in addition have the peculiarity of 
being constant in time. The main drawback arises due the impossibility of measuring 
these effects in any way, as they are non observable. 
 
                                                 
6 See appendix I for a detailed definition of variables. 
7 See Beck et al. (2003) for an interpretation of the determinants of the company size and Berger and 
Udell (1998) for a discussion about sources of financing firms can access according to their age. 
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Nevertheless, the method of estimation to be used will depend on whether this non-
observable is considered as fixed or random. They are fixed when they are correlated 
with the independent variables of the model. If, on the contrary, it is accepted that the 
non-observable effects are not correlated with the variables, they will be considered as 
random. 
 
To contrast the correlation between the individual effects and the independent variables, 
we use the Hausman test (Hausman, 1978). According the Hausman test, if the effects 
are uncorrelated with the variables, the fixed-effects and random-effects estimators 
should not be significantly different. Following this procedure the Hausman test shows 
that the independent variables are not correlated with non-observable heterogeneity. We 
estimate a random-effect unbalanced panel data, using the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) (Arellano, 2003), which allows us to control for endogenous by using 
instruments. Specifically, we follow the strategy proposed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991), which consists of using all the right-hand side variables lagged twice or more as 
instruments. This methodology assumes that that there is no second-serial correlation in 
the errors in first differences. For this reason, in order to test the consistency of the 
estimations, we use the test for the absence of second-serial correlation proposed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991). To test for the over-identifying restrictions, we employ the 
Sargan test, which tests for the absence of correlation between instruments and error 
term.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
In this section, we analyze the relationship between bank information monopoly and 
trade credit. First, we compare the average ratio of trade credit, bank credit, interest and 
the number of banking relationships by age and by size. Afterward, we test whether the 
informed non-financial companies can alleviate the problems of bank information 
monopolies by extend trade credit if the interest rate the bank sets is too severe or 
worsened, by analyzing companies that obtain funds from just one bank and those who 
obtain funds from several banks. Finally, we restrict our analysis to profitable 
companies, to investigate if the interest rate set by the banks is not only a consequence 
of information monopoly but due to a higher default risk. 
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Table I shows the average ratio of trade credit, bank credit, interest and the number of 
banking relationships, compared by age (panel A) and by size (panel B). 
 
TABLE I: Average ratio of trade credit, bank credit, interest and the number of 









Panel A: Distribution of Sample by Age a)       
Infant [0-5 years] 13.65% 18.57% 27.14% 7.43% 56.63% 43.59% 
Adolescent [5-10 years] 14.94% 18.97% 25.82% 7.85% 39.01% 32.64% 
Middle - Age [10-15 years] 15.24% 16.86% 27.68% 10.90% 19.17% 7.91% 
Old firms [15-25 years] 15.63% 15.25% 27.78% 12.64% 23.12% 16.24% 
Panel B: Distribution of Sample by Size b)       
Micro firms (< 10.000 Є) 12.10% 14.09% 20.03% 5.68% 48.04% 50.17% 
Small firms (10.000 Є – 20.000 Є) 14.97% 20.65% 30.75% 12.74% 31.38% 49.15% 
Medium firms (20.000 Є – 40.000 Є) 15.51% 18.75% 31.11% 32.17% 6.99% 0.68% 
a)
 We classify firms according to the age in line with Berger and Udell (2002); 
b) 
Size is measured by total assets (thousands of Euros); 
c)
 TC1 is the ratio of trade credit to total assets; 
d)
 TC2 is the ratio of trade credit to total debt; 
e)
 BC1 is the ratio of total debt to total assets; 
f)
 BC2 is the ratio of long – term debt to total liabilities; 
g) 
Interest is the ratio of interest expenses to the sum of short and large–term debt; 
h) 
DBank1 is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the company obtains funds from just one 
financial substitution, zero otherwise. 
 
Both ratio of trade credit (TC1 and TC2) report a similar value for Portuguese SME 
when analysed by age and size. When compared with bank credit (BC1), we could 
conclude trade credit represents a substantial component of both assets and liabilities. It 
accounts for roughly fifteen percent of total assets and twenty percent of total debt. 
Related to the ratio of bank credit, the medium and older companies show a higher 
financial leverage, particularly long-term debt (BC2). This result could be due to the 
result of the consolidation of the company’s reputation. Older and larger companies 
tend to be more diversified, less prone to bankruptcy, have better track record, and 
therefore should suffer less severe agency costs (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Indeed, the 
variable DBank1 shows that the older and larger companies work with more lenders. It 
would seem logical that the complexities deriving from size may encourage large 
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companies to divide their business across several banks. In addition, lenders likely want 
to maintain their connections with large companies because they can be overseen more 
easily. In fact, the youngest and smaller companies report higher interest rate. These 
preliminary results provide empirical evidence to the financing motive of trade credit, 
i.e., trade credit becomes less an instrument of trade and more an instrument of finance, 
despite the existence of a competitive banking sector (Nilsen, 2002; Berger and Udell, 
1998; Cunat, 2007)8. The descriptive statistics and correlations are presented in 
appendix II and III. 
 
Next, we focus on trade credit and we test whether the informed non-financial 
companies can alleviate the problems of bank information monopolies by analysing if 
borrowers extend trade credit when the bank sets higher interest rate. The results are 
reported in Table II. 
 
In table II we use the ratio of a company’s trade credit to its total assets (regressions 1 – 
5) and trade credit to total debt (regressions 6 – 10) as dependent variables. We first 
analyse the determinants of trade credit (regression 1 and 6). The coefficients of the 
variable demand for short-term credit are positive and statistically significant at 1% 
level. Thus, companies that demand short-term credit use more trade credit. This result 
is reinforced when analysing the variable interest. The coefficient of this variable in 
both regressions (1 and 6) is positive and statistically significant at 1% level, which 
indicates that when banks set a higher interest rate, the borrower extend trade credit 
from other non-financial companies. The coefficient of the tangible asset ratio is 
negative and statistically significant at 1% level (regression 1). The result remains 
unchanged if the dependent variable is the ratio trade credit to total debt (regression 6). 
Consistent with previous studies (e.g. Cunat, 2007; Atanasova, 2007), these results 
show that firms that hold less collateral assets use more trade credit than those with 
more collateral assets9.  
 
                                                 
8 Jaffee and Russel (1976) claim that banks have incentives to elevate the interest rate as the borrower 
increases the demand for funds, in order to put the market in a rationing situation. 
9 Many small companies also pledge their owner’s real estates as collateral. Because of lack of data, we 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Opposed to our expectation, the coefficient of the variable profitability is positive and 
statistically significant at 1% level, especially in regressions 6 to 10. This result is in 
line with empirical evidence providing by Marotta (2005). By using a sample of Italian 
companies, which are the top user of trade credit, Marotta (2005) shows that trade credit 
is not always more expensive than bank loans. Recall, that the evolution of the variable 
trade credit to total debt shows the relative changes in trade credit regarding to other 
debt sources of financing. The coefficient of the variables size and age are positive and 
statistically significant at 1% level (regressions 1 and 6) which are consistent with 
transaction costs theories (e.g. Schwartz, 1974; Ferris, 1981; Smith, 1987). Since large 
companies purchase more goods than smaller companies do, instead of paying bills 
every time goods are delivered, companies may centralize payments at the end of each 
month or quarter and use trade credit to bridge the period between purchase and 
payment. However, as pointed out by (Cunat, 2007:494) the relationship between age of 
the company and the levels of trade credit used is nonlinear. In fact, in regressions 2 to 5 
and 9 and 10, the coefficient of the variable age is negative and statistically significant 
at 1% level. This result can be explained due to the fact that new born companies start 
with low levels of trade credit that built very quickly in the early years of the company’s 
life. This reinforces the hypothesis that trade credit is related to the existence of a link 
between suppliers and customers. If this link takes time to build, then trade credit 
should grow as the relationship evolves (e.g. Mian and Smith, 1992; Miwa and 
Ramseyer, 2005; Cunat, 2007). Indeed, when we introduce in the regression (1) and (6) 
the variables DAge1 (infant firms), DAge2 (adolescent firms) and Dage3 (middle-age 
firms), dummy variables that take values one if the age of the company is between 0 and 
5 years, 5 to 10 years and 10 to 15 years, respectively and 0 otherwise, the coefficients 
of the variables Dage1 and Dage2 are negative and statistically significant while the 
coefficient of the variable Dage3 is positive (the results are available upon request from 
authors)10. 
 
As we discuss in an earlier section, Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992) and Detragiache et al. 
(2000) among others, claim that the problem of an information monopoly is serious 
when a borrower has a long-term relationship with one or few banks. Data from table I 
                                                 
10 Following Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) we have also included the variable age in quadric form. The 
variable appears non significant and was eliminated from the models. 
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shows that smaller and younger companies establish relationships with one bank. To 
investigate whether the problems of information monopolies are serious, we introduce 
in regression (2) and (7) the variable DBank1*Interest. As we expected, the coefficient 
of the variable DBank1*Interest is positive and statistically significant at 1% level 
(regression 2). In regression 7, although negative, the coefficient is not statistically 
significant. This result confirms that the proprietary borrower information that 
Hausbank obtained as an integral part of their relationships result in an information 
monopoly, which, in turn, materializes in charging interest rate that are, ex-post, too 
high. Furthermore when we introduce the variable DBank2 (a dummy variable that takes 
value 1 if the company works with two or more banks and 0 otherwise) in regressions 
(3) and (8), the coefficient of the variable DBank2*Interest reserve the signal, i.e. is 
negative and statistically significant which confirm that borrowers with higher 
dependency of Hausbank pay a higher interest rate. These results are consistent with 
recent studies (e.g. Angelini et al. 1998; Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000; Detragiache 
et al. 2000; Farinha and Santos, 2002) that find that borrowers tend to have relationships 
with multiple banks to avoid extraction of the rent from the banks11. In this context, 
borrowers increase the level of trade credit, since non-financial companies also have 
information about their creditworthiness.  
 
Although granting trade credit exposes the company to financial risks, the supplier may 
be willing to offer financing to constrained borrowers because the companies have 
broader interests than the financial transaction12. Contact from the selling process can 
facilitate the monitoring of customers on an ongoing basis, and suppliers can also use 
two-part terms to obtain information on creditworthiness (Smith, 1987). Thus, the 
supplier may benefit in the long run by helping a struggling customer stay in business 
and therefore make future sales13. Indeed, in regressions 2, 3, 7 and 8 the level of trade 
credit increases even when companies face low levels of sales growth and profitability 
is low. Thus, suppliers may act also as liquidity providers, supporting their customers, 
                                                 
11 If the company borrows from multiple informed banks, the Bertrand Competition with informed banks 
occurs and extracting the rent is impossible (Rajan, 1992). 
12 Indeed, Frank and Maksimovic (1999), Biais and Gollier (1997), Burkart and Elligsen (2004) and 
Cunat (2007) present models in which bank credit and trade credit are mixed optimally, i.e. in equilibrium 
companies use both trade credit and bank credit. 
13 The problems of information monopoly by suppliers are not serious (Cunat, 2007:494). For instance, 
Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) argued that the relative illiquidity of intermediate goods as compared cash 
makes trade credit useful in solving agency problems between creditors and borrowers. 
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especially when they experience temporary liquidity shocks14. According Cunat 
(2007:491), the necessary condition for this element exists is the presence of a surplus 
that is divided between suppliers and customers if they continue to do business15. 
 
In order to test the reaction of trade credit to unexpected changes in liquidity16, we 
introduce a dummy variable DLiquidity which that takes a value of 1 if liquidity drops 
more than 10% from the previous year and 0 otherwise. The variable liquidity can be 
seen as a proxy of borrower’s risk. A lower liquidity ratio implies that borrowers have 
fewer assets for immediate repayment of their loans. Generally, banks offer a higher 
interest rate if a company’s liquidity ratio is low because risk is higher and other 
misinformed banks do not make a loan to the borrower. The results are reported in 
columns (4) and (9). As we expected, the coefficients of the variable DLiquidity is 
positive and statistically significant at 1% level, indicating that the trade credit used is 
higher in company’s with low levels of liquidity and low levels of collateral assets17. 
The results related to the variables Interest and DBank1*Interest remains unchanged. 
These results confirm that trade credit grows more than other forms of credit whenever 
companies faced credit constrains and liquidity shocks. 
 
As suggested by Petersen and Rajan (1997) the most important challenge is to examine 
the determinants of trade credit over time. To capture a more dynamic relationship 
between trade credit and changes in interest rate, we use dynamic estimators. We follow 
Arellano-Bond (GMM) method to get a consistent estimator. This estimator correct for 
any contemporaneous endogenous problems, not just for these associated with the 
inclusion of a lagged dependent variable18 
                                                 
14 For example, Nielsen (2002) show how large healthy companies borrow in downturns as a way to 
extend more finance to their liquidity constrained customers. 
15 The idea of suppliers as liquidity providers is related to a stream of literature that concentrates the role 
of trade credit in liquidation default or renegotiation (e.g. Frank and Maksicmovic, 1999; Santos and 
Longhfer, 2003; Wilner, 2000; Huygherbaert et al. 2007; Huygherbaert, 2006). 
16  Liquidity is defined as the ratio of current assets minus inventories to total liabilities (see appendix I). 
This variable has been used in the literature to identify new financing constraints and negative shocks to 
firm prospects (e.g. Fazarri et al. 1998; Cleary, 1999). 
17 In regressions 9 and 10 the variable collateral change the signal to positive and statistically significant 
at 5% level and 10% level, respectively. One possible explanation for these results is due the fact that the 
evolution of the dependent variable (TC2 – trade credit to total debt) measures the change in trade credit 
with respect to debt.  
18 By taking first differences and using several lagged dependent variables (in first differences also) as 




Regressions 5 and 10 report the results. As we expected the coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variables is positive and statistically significant at 1% level. Indeed, this 
result provides empirical evidence that suppliers might also act as relationship lenders. 
The level of trade credit increases with the increase of demand for short term credit, 
particularly when companies face temporary liquidity constraints. The coefficient of the 
variable DBank1*Interest (positive and statistically significant in both regressions 5 and 
10) provides empirical evidence that borrowers with longer banking relationships pay a 
higher interest rate. Furthermore, smaller companies face information monopolies more 
serious (the coefficients of the variables size and age are negative and statistically 
significant). The sign of other variables are consistent with what we argued. 
 
The previous results indicate that the problems of information monopoly are serious for 
the small companies that have relationships with only one bank. The results reported in 
table II show that when the interest rate the bank sets is too severe or worsened for the 
borrower, the ratio of trade payables increases. However, the causes of higher interest 
rates by banks are unknown. This is not only information monopoly but also a 
consequence of higher default risk. If default risk of the borrower becomes higher, the 
bank sets higher interest rates, which is not caused by acquiring monopoly rent. To 
exclude such case, we restrict our analyses to the sample of profitable companies. We 
define profitable companies, companies whose profit rate (profitability) is superior to 
median of such ratio (see appendix II). In table III, we compare some variables between 
the two samples. 
                                                                                                                                               
coefficients of a model of the type ittiittiit xyy εληβδ ++++= −1, , where ηi is an individual error 
term, λt are temporary dummy variables, and εit is a standard error term (Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
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Table III: Comparison of descriptive statistics between two samples 
 









































































a) Satterthwaite-Welch t-test tests for differences in means, assumed unequal variance; 
b) Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test tests for differences in medians; 
(***) Significant at 1% level; (**) significant at 5% level; (*) significant at 10% level. 
 
 
The profitable companies are bigger and older. As we expected the differences related 
to mean and median of the variables sales and profitability are statistically significant at 
1% level. However, for the variables interest and collateral the differences (only for 
median value) are statistically significant at 10% level. Thus, profitable companies are 
not hit by negative shocks and their default risk is low, and therefore the interest rate for 
such companies is over competitive level. By limiting our analysis to the profitable 
companies, the cause of an increasing interest rate might be limited to acquire 
monopoly rent. In table IV, we present the regression results for profitable companies19. 
                                                 
19 Due to the lack number of observations, we are not able to estimate the dynamic model for profitable 
companies. 
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Table IV: The Relationship between Bank Information Monopoly and Trade 































































  -0.0929*** 
(-27.0785) 

































































All regressions are estimated by using GMM, which are robust to the heterocedasticity. Sargan Test 
tests of absence of over identification. TC1 is the ratio of trade credit to total assets; TC2 is the ratio 
of trade credit to total debt. The definition of remain variables is in appendix I. T-statistics appear in 
parentheses.  
(***) Significant at 1%; (**) Significant at 5%; (*) Significant 10%. 
 
The coefficient of the variable interest is positive and statistically significant (regression 
1 and 4). When introducing the variable Dbank1*Interest, the coefficient is positive and 
statistically significant at 1% level (regressions 2 and 5). This conclusion supports the 
results of two period models proposed by Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992). In their two 
period models, a bank that makes a loan to a borrower in period 1 acquires more 
accurate information about characteristics of the borrower. Since banks that do not 
make a loan to the borrower in period 1 face the problem of asymmetric information in 
period 2, the informed bank acquires an information monopoly over the borrower. Thus, 
the informed bank can set a higher interest rate level to extract monopoly rent. Indeed, 
when we replace the variable Dbank1*Interest by the variable Dbank2*Interest 
(regressions 3 and 6), the coefficient changes the signal and remains statistically 
significant at 1% level. Hence, to avoid the hold-up problem the borrowers make 
relationships with multiple banks (e.g. Detragiache et al. 2000; Farinha and Santos, 
2002). For remain variables the results are qualitatively similar. 
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5. Conclusion  
 
In this paper we investigate how serious is monopoly information for Portuguese small 
medium size companies (SMEs). We test if informed non-financial companies can 
extend trade credit in order to decrease the monopolist power of lenders that might lead 
to hold-up problems, by analysing companies that obtain funds from just one bank and 
those who obtain funds from several banks. 
 
By using a panel data of 468 Portuguese small companies for the period of 1998-2006, 
the empirical evidence strongly suggests that the problems of information monopolies 
are serious for the small companies that have relationships with only one or few banks. 
Thus, the proprietary borrowers information that Hausbanks obtain as an integral part of 
their relationships result in an information monopoly, which, in turn, lead to hold-up 
problems that materialize in Hausbank charging  interest rates that are, ex post, too high. 
Since suppliers may be able and have incentives to evaluate and control the credit risk 
of their customers (if buyers default, suppliers lose their sales and must revise their 
business strategy), they are able to provide additional lending to their customers. Thus, 
the provision of trade credit lightens the problem of information’s monopolies. 
 
Indeed, the results of our model confirm that companies that have less collateral assets 
cannot easily borrow from banks (i.e. bank credit is backward looking and depends on 
the collateral accumulated in previous periods), so they faced the problem of credit 
rationing. Due to the advantage of suppliers in salvaging value from existing assets, 
high interest rates are associated to an increase in the use of trade credit, which confirm 
the finance motive of trade credit (e.g. Ferris, 1981; Franks et al. 1985; Biais and 
Gollier, 1997; Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004). Furthermore, the results support the 
existence of a link between suppliers and customers that takes time to build and leads to 
suppliers help their customers who experience temporary liquidity shocks. Hence trade 
creditors act as relationship lenders. Due to the positive relationship found between 
trade credit and profitability, and as pointed out by Marotta (2005), the evidence that 
trade credit is more expensive than bank loans still is an open issue. These results are 
robust to dynamic estimators. Furthermore the monopolistic power of the Hausbank is 
confirmed when we restrict our empirical formulation to profitable companies. 
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This paper focuses on trade credit and test whether the informed non-financial firms can 
alleviate the problems of bank information monopolies. So an important aspect of trade 
credit is the two-way nature of the transaction. Many companies, particularly those at 
time points in the value chain, use trade credit as customers and provide are as 
suppliers. Thus, trade credit represents a substantial component of both corporate 
liabilities and assets. Alongside this obvious importance, further research should 
investigate how trade credit, by generating a chain of bankruptcies can have a feedback 
on the economic development, to provide recommendations to policy makers. For 
instance, the credit channel of monetary policy transmission predicts that when 
monetary policy tightens the reduction of institutional loans induces companies to 
increase their use of trade credit (e.g. Blasio, 2005; Mateut et al. 2006; Atsanova, 2007). 
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Collateral =  
nsInstitutioFinancialwithDebtTermLargeandShort
ExpensesInterest
Interest =  
 
DBank1 = Dummy that takes value 1 if the company works with just one bank and 0 
otherwise 
 
DBank2 = Dummy that takes value 1 if the company works with more than two banks 
and 0 otherwise 
 
DInteraction1 = DBank1 * Interest Rate 
 
DInteraction 2 = DBank2 * Interest Rate 
 
 































Age = Ln (time elapsed between the company’s founding date and the year of 
measurement) 
 








DLiquidity = Dummy that takes the value 1 if the variable liquidity drops more than 
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